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In Pragmatism and the Reflective Life, Stuart Rosenbaum deftly weaves moral themes 
around the locus of pragmatism, using these themes to defend the titular “reflec-
tive life.” The leading figure here is John Dewey, who, in his writings on democracy, 
community, and morality, provides the basis for reflective living. Rosenbaum, in 
explicating the main ways pragmatism deviates from traditional historical philo-
sophical models, provides a clear explanation of pragmatism to his readers. He 
achieves his main goal, clarifying the meaning of pragmatism and its attendant 
democratic ideology: ecumenism.
Rosenbaum states that “the content of the reflective life . . . is its commitment 
to autonomy, community, and ideality” (157). He approaches these themes through 
chapters entitled, “Pragmatism,” “From Moral Theory to the Reflective Life,” “The 
Reflective Life,” “Ideals,” “Deliberation,” “Education,” and “Ecumenism.” Rosen-
baum, in “Pragmatism,” sets the stage for the exploration of the reflective life and 
provides a clear and concise understanding of the nature of pragmatism, especially 
in regard to the work of John Dewey. 
To begin with, says Rosenbaum, one must understand what features distin-
guish pragmatism from traditional Western philosophy—its focus on experience 
and its endorsement of radical empiricism. In regard to the former, Rosenbaum un-
derscores “the central intellectual commitment of the pragmatist tradition, the idea 
that experience itself is the source of its own guidance; experience itself is the source 
of aims and methods, principles, goals, and ideals that may yield better experience 
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and better institutions.” He further notes that “experience does not need the guide 
of external authority; it needs no external control to achieve betterment” (25). In 
regard to the latter, he lays out three definitive differences between the radical em-
piricism of pragmatists and traditional empiricism. The first difference, Rosenbaum 
makes clear, is that pragmatism treats epistemology and metaphysics as socially and 
culturally embedded (26). Pragmatists are especially attuned to how metaphysical 
and epistemological problems stem from specific contexts: “Since pragmatists see all 
phenomena, even sophisticated intellectual phenomena, as fully embedded within 
cultural and ecological contexts, they think that understanding such phenomena 
requires understanding those contexts. This respect for cultural context is the second 
definitive difference between pragmatism and classical empiricism” (26-27). This re-
spect for culture is manifested in a genealogical understanding of moral problems. 
In other words, moral problems arise through and in specific cultural contexts. 
The third difference Rosenbaum identifies stems from pragmatism’s respect 
for science. Science, considered as a tool, “enables cognitive interactions within hu-
man environments, cultural and natural, but it does not enable knowledge tran-
scending those environments” (29). Pragmatism’s rejection of the quest for tran-
scendent knowledge is, in fact, the main theme underlying the differences between 
radical empiricism and classical empiricism. This pragmatic theme is clearly illus-
trated in the works of John Dewey. Rosenbaum makes this theme explicit, stating 
that “pragmatists do not seek conceptual universality, conceptual necessity, or a 
priori knowledge. Instead, pragmatists see humans as thoroughly embedded in 
their natural world, and this embedding includes their concepts and their ability 
to manipulate those concepts” (2). This position distinguishes pragmatists from 
philosophers of other traditions. Rosenbaum continues: “Conceptual universal-
ity, necessity, and a priori knowledge, the primary goals of analytic philosophers, 
are not goals for pragmatists  because pragmatists do not regard those things as 
separable in thought from the widest possible human agreement about how to use 
ideas of morality and religion to seek better lives for individuals and communities” 
(2-3). Here Rosenbaum brings Dewey into the conversation, noting that he reacted 
against those strains of “Western thought that seek transcendence for humanity,” 
by recalling “humanity back to the natural world” (4). 
According to Rosenbaum, the recognition of the import of cultural context—
and moral genealogies—allow humans to lead the reflective life. Rosenbaum continues 
to display a solid grasp of pragmatism in his chapter on deliberation, a main theme in 
pragmatist ethics, and one related to social and cultural appreciation. As Rosenbaum 
artfully explains, agents deliberate when faced with difficult situations (107). In these 
situations, one is required to “be deliberate about one’s action” because “one does not 
rely on habitual responses” (108). Confronting an unusual situation, one’s patterns 
of actions—habits—are interrupted. It is here that one partakes in what John Dewey 
calls “imaginative rehearsal.” Rosenbaum writes: “As Dewey puts it, deliberation is 
imaginative rehearsal and is dramatic and active. Deliberation is seeing possibilities 
for problem situations and trying out possibilities before acting in accord with them” 
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(111).  This is a vital part of both morality and human psychology. When faced with 
a problematic situation, dramatic rehearsal allows us to foresee the outcome of each 
possible path of action and to review them psychologically before actually acting. 
Rosenbaum, continuing to draw from Dewey, ties deliberation and commu-
nity together before discussing ecumenism. Borrowing from Peirce, Rosenbaum 
explains that to overcome the traditional divide between the emotional and rational, 
beliefs must be considered as habits of action (111-12). These habits arise from the 
social conditions existing within our communities. Rosenbaum explains, “What 
are pragmatists’ reasons for accepting the idea that beliefs are habits of action? A 
key reason is pragmatists’ embrace of the historicity of all human phenomena . . . 
The things that seem most obvious and patently true—even things thought of as a 
priori—seem so because of cultural conditions” (114). Here, Rosenbaum allows one 
to see the overlap between action as habit and the genealogy of  historical phenom-
ena in pragmatist thinking. In short, beliefs stem from history; communities form 
individuals. Nevertheless, the individual and the community are sometimes at odds.
The tension between individuality and community is reconciled in education: 
“This symbiotic integration [of community and individuality] needs, as Dewey also 
saw, an understanding of education that enables both growth of individuality and 
integrity of community” (134-35). Education is not merely fact oriented. Rather, it 
must also be habit oriented; “education becomes a matter of engendering habits, of 
habit-offering; and learning becomes a matter of acquiring habits, of habit-taking” 
(138). Because, for pragmatists, persons are biological organisms and, as such, are 
not independent from their environments (137), education must encourage the de-
velopment of different abilities from one context to another (138). Everything in an 
environment is significant to the learner, as learning instills habits, and “all educa-
tion is value education” (151). Education provides the skills and capacities for an 
individual, but it is through deliberation—dramatic rehearsal of possibilities—that 
an individual adjusts and adapts to an environment, while still choosing her own 
moral possibilities from a given set of conditions.
Institutional inertia is one threat that an environment often poses. It is also an 
obstacle to the goal of ecumenism, defined by Rosenbaum as “the goal of a shared 
understanding of values, even though these values may be rooted in different tradi-
tions” (158). With regard to religion, for example, ecumenism “is the idea of over-
coming institutional inertia in the direction of unity with other religious institu-
tions” (158). Preserving tradition, a defense of institutional inertia, is, as Rosenbaum 
explains, merely exclusive. It is an excuse to maintain the status quo and exclude 
those who hold different values and beliefs and thus might change that tradition. 
In fact, the inclusivity or exclusivity of institutions is the deciding factor in the de-
sirability of ecumenism. Rosenbaum defends ecumenism’s inclusivity, stating that 
those who argue against it merely defend the status quo and “perpetuate an intel-
lectual culture oriented around issues of justification” (160). He challenges ecumen-
ism’s detractors, insisting that “those who participate even as critics or skeptics are 
in effect supporters, intentionally or not, of that same institutional inertia” (161). 
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Pragmatism relates to ecumenism because to understand humans “as integral 
parts of their natural world, and to see them as having developed in diverse, geo-
graphically different communities but also having . . . common needs and interests 
. . . is to understand also that there are possibilities to overcome diversity in the di-
rection of greater integration and harmony” (162). Democracy is best suited to ac-
commodate ecumenism. Democracy maximizes the potential for both individual 
growth and autonomy and “encourages ideals of community integrity and individ-
ual achievement” (162). On Dewey’s account, autonomy, community, and ideality 
come together. According to Rosenbaum, “values and ideals are as concrete as the 
humans who hold them” (157). Their concreteness makes pragmatic commitments 
to meliorism and ecumenism possible since “the very fact that they are rooted in hu-
man institutions, along with our knowledge of the vicissitudes of such institutions, 
encourages the idea that they are as malleable as other dimensions of culture” (158).
It is in this last chapter on ecumenism, however, that Rosenbaum runs into 
some difficulties. If, as Rosenbaum states, values are made concrete in the form of 
human institutions, then what privileges Rosenbaum’s pragmatic values (autonomy, 
integrity, and achievement) above nondemocratic values? If we must be ecumenical, 
should we also seek to subsume “non-reflective” lives under those values integral 
to “reflective” lives? Or, must we overlook Rosenbaum’s earlier Deweyan claims 
that values are institutional, and claim instead that values are in effect worthwhile 
independent of their institutional contexts? 
Aside from these few minor issues, Pragmatism and the Reflective Life is a fine 
work by someone who admits he came to pragmatism late in his academic career. 
Though Rosenbaum’s chapter on ecumenism leaves one asking many questions, the 
strengths of the work far outweigh its weaknesses. Rosenbaum clearly understands 
the tradition of American pragmatism and, though his analysis relies heavily on John 
Dewey, he also mentions the works of James, Peirce, and even Royce. His clarity of 
thought runs through and unifies the variety of themes present in his book—ethi-
cal deliberation, imagination, cultural contextualization, and education—and ends 
in the hope for ecumenism and global melioration, for humans to work worldwide 
to improve our condition and that of others. The interweaving of themes belies the 
very bedrock of pragmatism—to live rather than theorize a philosophical outlook. 
In this way, Rosenbaum also accomplishes the task of recapturing the spirit of prag-
matism, separating it from the naïve view of pragmatism motivating savvy business 
practices and common-sense politics. Pragmatism and the Reflective Life makes a 
fine addition to any bookshelf, whether it be that of a beginner in philosophy, or one 
who has devoted one’s life to studying this unique American tradition. 
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